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ELECTION OF REMEDIES: THE CALIFORNIA BASIS
Many justifications have been suggested for the doctrine of elec-
tion of remedies. The Supreme .Court has stated that it protects a
defendant from vexatious litigation.' In addition, prevention of plain-
tiff from pleading untrue facts has been stated as the "fundamental
reason" for the doctrine.2 This justification is in fact nonexistent,
since the plaintiff can now plead in the alternative and amend his
complaint "in the belief that he is stating the facts just so far as
they are clear to him."3 Prevention of double satisfaction has also
been deemed the controlling reason for the election doctrine.4 When-
ever the doctrine is applied, no matter what its justification, it
denies the plaintiff any recovery in a second action.5
This note will discuss whether the same purposes, prevention
of vexatious litigation, untrue facts, and double satisfaction, can be
accomplished by other legal theories. It has been suggested that
either estoppel or res judicata can be applied to achieve the same
results without resort to the election of remedies doctrine." If this
is so, the use of such other doctrines would clarify the law and
simplify the lawyer's task by abolishing election of remedies as an oft-
invoked doctrine.
Definition of Election of Remedies
Election of remedies is an affirmative defense. To use the de-
fense, the defendant must show that the plaintiff possesses two in-
consistent and concurrent remedies to a single cause of action.7 If
the plaintiff has chosen one of these remedies, he cannot bring a
second action. The difficulty is in determining what remedies courts
consider inconsistent and what constitutes a single cause of action.
These requirements often seem "conclusions too nebulous and tech-
nical in themselves to serve as the foundation for the ultimate con-
clusion of rights and liabilities."1
8
1 United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922). "The doc-
trine of election of remedies and that of res adjudicata are not the same, but
they have this in common, that each has for its underlying basis the maxim
which forbids that one shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause."
Id. at 301.
2 C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 77 at 495 (2d ed. 1947).
3 Id. § 77 at 495-96.
4 E.g., Miller v. Hyde, 161 Mass. 472, 37 N.E. 760 (1894).
5 The word "action" used in this note means a court action. Unless
otherwise specified, the phrase "cause of action" means the Pomeroy defini-
tion of a cause of action which is discussed at a later point in the text.
6 5A C. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§1217, 1220 (l.964).
7 E.g., Herdan v. Hanson, 182 Cal. 538, 541-42, 189 P. 440, 442 (1920);
Deinard & Deinard, Election of Remedies (pt. 1), 6*MNg. L. REv. 341 (1922).
8 Note, The Form and Reform of the Election Between Remedies Doc-
trine in Ohio, 8 W. RES. L. REv. 82, 88 (1957).
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Inconsistent Remedies
A plaintiff should be able to foresee the acts which a court will
consider inconsistent. If a plaintiff has committed such acts, his sec-
ond action on the same facts will be defeated. Some California
dictum has concluded that rescission is effectual when the plaintiff
merely gives notice of an intention to rescind the contract.9 By
that authority the plaintiff is denied an action for damages because
of an inconsistent act performed before litigation. Some recent deci-
sions have refused to find that an act performed prior to litigation
can be considered so inconsistent as to allow the defense of election
of remedies. 10 One district court of appeal case, Karapetian v. Caro-
Zan," involving fraud in a contract to sell land, confined the applica-
tion of inconsistency to situations where there had been a previous
court action. The plaintiff had sent notice of rescission, which had
been ignored. He then brought an action seeking damages based on
misrepresentation. In the latter action the defendant could not set
up the defense of election of remedies.12  The court rejected lan-
guage in earlier cases which could be used to support an argument
that notice of rescission amounts to "effectual rescission."' 3  While
agreeing that the plaintiff's acts were inconsistent, the Karapetian
court pointed out that the defendant's refusal to acknowledge the
notices left the plaintiff free to pursue an action for rescission or for
damages based on fraud.' 4
Despite the reluctance of Karapetian v. Carolan to use incon-
sistency, the plaintiff still cannot determine how another court will
apply the requirement. A recent case, Paularena v. Superior Court,
construed section 1692 of the California Civil Code, which provides
that any relief awarded "shall not include duplicate or inconsistent
items of recovery," as perpetuating the inconsistency requirement in
election of remedies.' 5 More logically the statute denies the plaintiff
double recovery, rather than denying his second action on the grounds
of inconsistency. Cases which state that notice was sufficient to
amount to an inconsistent act,16 the contrary view of Karapetian v.
Carolan,17 and the discussion in the Paularena1 8 case illustrate the
plaintiff's difficulty in determining whether he has committed in-
consistent acts. Because of the uncertain application of the incon-
sistency requirement, it is submitted that the test is neither useful
nor helpful.
9 E.g., Ito v. Watanabe, 213 Cal. 487, 488, 2 P.2d 799, 800 (1931).
10 Coleman v. Southern Pac. Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 121, 296 P.2d 386
(1956); Karapetian v. Carolan, 83 Cal. App. 2d 344, 188 P.2d 809 (1948); see
Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal. 2d 826, 249 P.2d 264 (1952).
11 83 Cal. App. 2d 344, 188 P.2d 809 (1948).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 350, 188 P.2d at 813. The opinion disapproved of Ito v. Watanabe,
213 Cal. 487, 2 P.2d 799 (1931), Prewitt v. Sunnymead Orchard Co., 189 Cal.
723, 209 P. 995 (1922), and Loaiza v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. 11, 24 P. 707
(1890).
14 83 Cal. App. 2d at 355, 188 P.2d at 815.
35 Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 915, 42 Cal. Rptr.
366, 372 (1965).
16 Note 9 supra.
17 83 Cal. App. 2d 344, 188 P.2d 809 (1948).
i8 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 915, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366, 372 (1965).
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Single Cause of Action
The additional requirement that the plaintiff must have a single
cause of action before the defendant can plead election of remedies has
been discussed less often than the inconsistency requirement. If
there has been fraud in a contract to sell land, the vendee may ask
for specific performance, damages, or rescission and restitution. De-
pending on the jurisdiction's definition of a cause of action, the plain-
tiff may have a single cause of action or multiple causes of action.
California applies the Pomeroy definition of a cause of action 9
which states that a single cause of action amounts to an invasion of
one "primary right" for which more than one remedy may be avail-
able.20 In a contract to sell land where there has been fraud, Pro-
fessor Pomeroy expressly concludes that the plaintiff has only one
cause of action,21 and three remedies-specific performance, damages,
or rescission. Pomeroy also illustrates his definition of a cause of
action when a vendor refuses to perform a contract to convey land,
the vendee has a single cause of action with two remedial rights-
compensation in damages or specific performance. 22 Both examples,
fraud in a land contract and refusal to perform a land contract, are
common fact situations where the court is faced with an election of
remedies problem.
Professor Clark defines a single cause of action as "an aggregate
of operative facts .... "23 Under this definition, a single cause of
action amounts to a collection of facts sufficient for a court to grant
some recovery to the plaintiff. A "cause of action ... [consists] of
facts which should afford ground or occasion for the court to give
judicial relief of some kind .... "24 This definition implies that in the
situation of fraud in a contract to sell land as the example discussed
above, the plaintiff would have one cause of action for specific per-
formance, a cause of action in rescission, and a cause of action in
damages for breach of contract. Professor Clark's theory thus
reaches a different result as to what amounts to a cause of action
from the Pomeroy definition discussed above.
Scope of the Election Doctrine
Both writers and courts attempt to distinguish between a plain-
tiff's substantive and remedial rights,2 5 since election of remedies ap-
plies only to remedial rights. 26 This distinction to a large degree is
19 Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 638, 134 P.2d 242,
244 (1943); 2 B. WITKu, CALIFoRNIA PRocEDuRE Pleading § 11 (1954).
20 J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 347, at 528 (5th ed. 1929).
21 Id. at § 353, at 542.
22 Id. at § 348, at 530-31.
23 C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 19, at 127 (2d ed. 1947).
24 Id. § 19, at 137.
25 Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co., 238 N.Y. 308, 311, 144 N.E. 592, 593
(1924); Martin Music Co. v. Robb, 115 Cal. App. 414, 419, 1 P.2d 1000, 1002
(1931); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 381, comment d at 713 (1932); Yerkes,
Election of Remedies in Cases of Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 26 S. CAL. L.
REv. 157 (1953).
26 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 381, comment d at 713 (1932); Yerkes,
Election of Remedies in Cases of Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 26 S. CAL. L.
REV. 157, 157-58 (1953).
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dependent on the definition of "a cause of action" adopted. Com-
mentators on election of remedies, because they have applied the
Clark definition of a cause of action, have concluded that a plaintiffs
decision to rescind or ask for damages for breach of contract amounts
to a substantive choice.27 Thus, impliedly a single cause of action
under the Clark definition is equivalent to a substantive right. A
remedial right is possible only in a few situations.28 Plaintiffs
remedial rights arise only after he has made a substantive choice and
finds that he has different remedies to effectuate that substantive
right.29 As an example, according to the writers, if a plaintiff has
decided to affirm his substantive right of ownership in certain prop-
erty wrongfully occupied by another, he has two remedies available.30
He can sue on the common law assumpsit count to recover rents and
profits, or he can bring an action in ejectment coupled with a prayer
for damages. Both the action for rent and the ejectment action
affirm the plaintiff's allegation of ownership in the land. Only in such
a situation is there an election of remedies. Actions for rescission
and for breach of contract under this definition amount to substan-
tive choices.
California courts apply the election of remedies doctrine only to
remedial rights.31 The courts, however, do not use the definition of
remedial rights suggested by the writers on election of remedies.
Instead, they distinguish remedial from substantive rights on the
basis of the Pomeroy classification. This classification states that a
choice to affirm or disaffirm ownership is a remedial right3 2 pursuant
to a single cause of action. In an action for damages based on breach of
contract or rescission, the plaintiff is choosing between remedies, not
substantive rights. Thus, the election of remedies doctrine in Cal-
ifornia has a much broader impact than the writers in the field en-
visioned. The desirability of such an extension, as well as the alleged
basis of the doctrine, will be considered in this note.
Ratification as a Basis for the Election Doctrine
Bancroft v. Woodward33 announced that the doctrine of election
of remedies applies whenever a plaintiff has ratified a transaction. In
an action for rents due on a lease, the defendant by way of cross-
complaint asked for rescission. He further asked that if rescission
were unavailable, he be granted damages due to fraudulent misrepre-
27 C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 77, at 494 (2d ed. 1947); Deinard & Deinard,
Election of Remedies (pt. 1), 6 MINN. L. REV. 341, 358 (1922).
28 C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 77, at 494 (2d ed. 1947); Deinard & Deinard,
Election of Remedies (pt. 2), 6 MINN. L. REV. 480, 495-507 (1922).
29 Deinard & Deinard, Election of Remedies, 6 Mn. L. REv. 341, 359
(1922).
30 C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 77, at 494 (2d ed. 1947); Deinard & Deinard,
Election of Remedies (pt. 1), 6 MINN. L. REV. 341, 359-62, 495-507 (1922).
31 Cf. Martin Music Co. v. Robb, 115 Cal. App. 414, 419, 1 P.2d 1000,
1002 (1931); 2 B. WIT=IN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Pleading § 11 (1954). See
generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 381, comment d at 713 (1932).
32 See J. POMEROY, CODE PLEADING §§ 348-55, at 530-31 (5th ed. 1929).
For California cases, see 2 B. WITKIN, CALOIFORIA PROCEDURE Pleading § 11
(1954).
33 183 Cal. 99, 190 P. 445 (1920).
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sentations. The rescission plea failed due to laches and at that
point the lessor alleged that an election of remedies had occurred.
The court refused to find that an unsuccessful attempt to rescind the
lease prevented the damage plea. It stated: "The right to damages
exists unless and until the transaction is effectually disaffirmed."3 4
Since rescission had been denied, the transaction had not been dis-
affirmed. The court stated that if the plaintiff had first brought an
action for damages, he would have lost any subsequent right to dis-
affirm because the election of remedies doctrine prevented a subse-
quent rescission.3 5  The remedies in that order are "wholly incon-
sistent.136 This dictum has been frequently discussed in later cases.
37
Yet, the same result can be reached without any discussion of in-
consistency or ratification. If the court in the first action had con-
cluded that no contract existed between the parties, res judicata
would prevent a plaintiff from seeking a subsequent determination
of that same fact. A plaintiff would only be able to seek restitution
of money had and received. Further, a plaintiff may be precluded
from a subsequent rescission action if the defendant can show unrea-
sonable delay, failure of timely notice, or any other equitable defense
available in rescission actions.38 Such a defense would be likely,
since a prior breach of contract action would cause delay and the
plaintiff would be unlikely to give notice. Either alternative is
preferable to a defense based on the theoretical inconsistency of the
plaintiff's actions.
Authors agree that a plaintiff frequently affirms a transaction
only to receive some recovery.3 9 It is often immaterial to him
whether the court grants damages or allows rescission. Yet, if he
should happen to bring the actions in the "wrong" order (breach of
contract followed by rescission), he may find that he is denied any
relief at all under the election doctrine. In this situation the con-
cept of inconsistency works an injustice. In situations where a plain-
tiff should be denied relief in the second action, discussion of incon-
sistency may blur the fact that the defendant can show res judicata
or an equitable defense.
Satisfaction as the Basis for the Election Doctrine
Unlike ratification, satisfaction disregards inconsistency in finding
34 Id. at 102, 190 P. at 446.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 915, 42 Cal. Rptr.
366, 372 (1965); Karapetian v. Carolan, 83 Cal. App. 2d 344, 347, 188 P.2d
809, 813 (1948); Hjorth v. Bernstein, 44 Cal. App. 2d 561, 565, 112 P.2d 643,
645 (1941); Gutterman v. Gally, 131 Cal. App. 647, 653, 21 P.2d 1000, 1003
(1933).
38 See J. DAWSON & G. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 226 (2d ed. 1958).
39 5 S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, CoNTAcTs § 1528 (rev. ed. 1936);
Yerkes, Election of Remedies in Cases of Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 26 S.
CAL. L. Ruv. 157, 161 (1953); Note, Election of Remedies: When is Election
Irrevocable in Contract-Fraud Situations?, 36 CALW. L. REv. 636 (1948).
"[T]his rule seems unreasonable because bringing suit does not necessarily
constitute affirmance of the contract. There is no apparent reason for saying
plaintiff may disaffirm and then affirm while saying that he may not affirm
and then disaffirm." Id. at 642.
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an election of remedies. Theoretically, satisfaction considers only the
recovery obtained in the first action in deciding if the second action
will be precluded. California courts originally announced satisfac-
tion as a basis of the election doctrine in House v. Piercy.40 The
vendee had not brought two separate actions, but had submitted a
two-count complaint. The first count treated a contract to sell land
as rescinded by asking for money had and received. The second count
treated the contract as effective by asking for damages for breach.
The court concluded that this procedure was "not materially dif-
ferent from the situation that would have existed had he brought
two separate actions .... ,'41 Before trial the defendant tendered
and the plaintiff accepted the sum asked for in the first count. The
court concluded that rescission was thereby effectuated. 42 It refused
to hear the plea for damages. Under both counts the vendee had
asked for the same amount, so the court reasonably assumed that he
had been satisfied.
The fact that the plaintiff in House v. Piercy received the entire
amount asked for has been overlooked when applying the satisfaction
test.43 It must be emphasized that satisfaction in House v. Piercy
amounted to the "effectual manner" in which rescission was declared.
Reserve Oil and Gas Co. v. Metzenbaum 44 cited the following state-
ment from House: "[I]f the facts exist which justify rescission by
one party, and he exercises his right and declares a rescission in some
effectual manner, he terminates the contract . . . ."45 Disregarding
the facts which prompted House v. Piercy to state the conclusion
quoted above, the court in Reserve Oil and Gas Co. used the state-
ment to support its conclusion that notice of default on a lease given
to the defendant can amount to an election.46 The same result could
have been reached by emphasizing the contract which stated that
notice of default with failure to remedy within 30 days amounted to
termination. If that had been done, the court would have avoided
reliance on the "effectual manner" test in a situation significantly
different from that where the test was first applied.
Karapetian v. Carolan47 refused to apply the "effectual manner"
test when the plaintiff had merely given notice of rescission. The
Karapetian court concluded that the plaintiff made no election until
he received satisfaction. This holding more closely parallels the fac-
tual situation in House v. Piercy, the case that first enunciated the
test. Thus, Karapetian reached seemingly contradictory conclusions
from Reserve Oil and Gas Co. by applying the same test. Since the
plaintiff cannot predict what will be considered an election of reme-
dies under satisfaction, the test enunciated in House v. Piercy is not
an adequate basis for the election doctrine.
40 181 Cal. 247, 183 P. 807 (1919).
41 Id. at 252, 183 P. at 809.
42 Id.
43 E.g., Reserve Oil & Gas Co. v. Metzenbaum, 84 Cal. App. 2d 769, 191
P.2d 796 (1948).
44 181 Cal. at 252, 183 P. at 809.
45 84 Cal. App. 2d 769, 191 P.2d 796 (1948).
46 Id. at 775, 191 P.2d at 800.
47 83 Cal. App. 2d 344, 188 P.2d 809 (1948).
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Equitable Estoppel as a Basis for the Election Doctrine
In California, equitable estoppel, not ratification or satisfaction, is
the most commonly stated basis of election of remedies.48 Since
cases discussing estoppel as the basis of the election doctrine are
numerous, the following discussion is restricted to a selection of
them. Cases where equitable estoppel clearly applies will be ex-
amined first. Subsequently, attention will be given to instances
where equitable estoppel has perhaps been over-extended.
Defrimental Reliance: Applicable Cases
Before a plaintiff can be estopped in a second action, the de-
fendant must show detrimental reliance-real injury.49  It is well
established in California that a levy on a writ of attachment granted
pursuant to plaintiff's first action prevents him from bringing a sec-
ond action where attachment is not available.50 Courts consider
attachment a sufficient act whereby the plaintiff gains advantage
over the defendant. The defendant has clearly been restricted in
the use of the property attached.8 ' If the plaintiff can assert actions
based on tort or contract, he is deemed to have elected the contract
remedy if he attaches the defendant's property.5 2 Since attachment
is not available in tort actions, the plaintiff cannot have the security
of the defendant's property and then later abandon the contract
action for a possibly more remunerative tort recovery.53 Steiner v.
48 E.g., Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal. 2d 713, 720, 221 P.2d 9, 13 (1950);
Commercial Centre Realty Co. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 2d 121, 129, 59 P.2d
978, 982 (1936); Pacific Coast Cheese, Inc. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 45
Cal. 75, 80, 286 P.2d 353, 356 (1930); Campanella v. Campanella, 204 Cal. 515,
521, 269 P. 433, 435 (1928); Roullard v. Rosenberg Bros. & Co., 193 Cal. 360,
366, 224 P. 449, 451 (1924); Mansfield v. Pickwick Stages, Inc., 191 Cal. 129,
131, 215 P. 389, 390 (1923); Modoc Mineral & Oil Co. v. Cal-Vada Drilling &
Exploration Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 868, 875, 46 Cal. Rptr. 508, 510 (1965); Chico
Tractor, Inc. v. Coyle, 215 Cal. App. 2d 483, 487, 30 Cal. Rptr. 196, 198 (1963);
Lenard v. Edmonds, 151 Cal. App. 2d 764, 770, 312 P.2d 308, 310 (1957); De
Laval Pac. Co. v. United Cleaners & Dyers Co., 65 Cal. App. 584, 586, 224 P.
767 (1924).
49 4 B. WITKm, SumMARY OF CALIFoaNiA LAW Equity § 94 (1954).
50 Jones v. Martin, 41 Cal. 2d 23, 256 P.2d 905 (1953); Estrada v. Alvarez,
38 Cal. 2d 386, 240 P.2d 278 (1952); Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal. 2d 713, 221
P.2d 9 (1950); Modoc Mineral & Oil Co. v. Cal-Vada Drilling & Exploration
Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 868, 46 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1965); Barrett v. Hammer Builders,
Inc., 195 Cal. App. 2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1961); Eistrat v. Northern Lumber
Co., 190 Cal. App. 2d 267, 12 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1961); Goosen v. Adair, 185 Cal.
App. 2d 810, 8 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1960); Lenard v. Edmonds, 151 Cal. App. 2d
764, 312 P.2d 308 (1957) (dictum); Crag Lumber Co. v. Crofoot, 144 Cal. App.
2d 755, 301 P.2d 952 (1956); Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, 125 Cal. App. 2d 175,
270 P.2d 505 (1954).
51 Barrett v. Hammer Builders, Inc., 195 Cal. App. 2d 305, 316, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 49, 56 (1961).
52 Id.
83 See Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, 125 Cal. App. 2d 175, 179, 270 P.2d
505, 509 (1954): "So far as the judgment here makes an award in the tort
measure of damages it must be held to be erroneous .... 
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Rowley54 is most frequently cited for this conclusion.55 The plaintiff
had been issued a writ of attachment against the defendant to secure
his quasi-contract action for money had and received. While agree-
ing that a count for tort could be pleaded in the same complaint, the
court denied recovery based on tort.5 6 The plaintiff had elected
to stand on the implied contract when the court issued the writ of-
attachment. Thus, he could be estopped from proceeding on the
tort count.
When attachment is not available in an alternative action, it is
quite easy to see that the defendant has grounds for claiming an
estoppel. However, there are situations when attachment is avail-
able in both actions. In these cases it is more difficult to determine
why there has been injury to the defendant sufficient to amount to
estoppel. In Crag Lumber Co. v. Crofoot,57 the plaintiff filed a com-
plaint containing a count in rescission plus money had and received
and a second count based on a written contract. On the same day the
court issued a writ of attachment. The defendant sought to prevent
recovery on breach of contract by alleging injury from an attachment
levied pursuant to the count in rescission. The court concluded that
the defendant could not assume that attachment was based on the
rescission count.5 s Since the amount in the affidavit for attachment
paralleled that asked for in the breach of contract action, the court
concluded that the attachment was based on that count.5 9 Even if
the attachment had been based on the rescission count, it is difficult
to see how the defendant could show any real injury when the plain-
tiff would have been allowed an attachment on both causes of action.
Estoppel has been applied in situations which do not involve
attachments. An early case, De Laval Pacific Co. v. United Cleaners
and Dyers Co.,60 also required the defendant to show detrimental
reliance before he could interpose election of remedies as a defense.
In a conditional sales contract action, the seller in pursuit of rescis-
sion had demanded that the buyer return the machines sold. The'
buyer returned the machine, but an essential part was missing. When
the seller brought a subsequent action for the sale price, the buyer's
defense of election of remedies was denied. The court found that
the seller had gained no advantage and the buyer had suffered no
loss by return of the machine.61
Ferguson v. Fajardo62 is a recent case applying estoppel as the
basis of the election doctrine. The vendee filed a complaint for dam-
ages based on breach of a contract to sell an apartment building.
Two years later the court allowed an amendment asking for spe-
cific performance. In approving the amendment the court quoted
Witkin: "[D] espite a clearly manifested intention to pursue one of
54 35 Cal. 2d 713, 221 P.2d 9 (1950).
55 E.g., Crag Lumber Co. v. Crofoot, 144 Cal. App. 2d 755, 759, 301 P.2d
952, 961 (1956).
B6 Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal. 2d 713, 720, 221 P.2d 9, 13 (1950).
57 144 Cal. App. 2d 755, 301 P.2d 952 (1956).
58 Id. at 761, 301 P.2d at 962.
59 Id.
60 65 Cal. App. 584, 224 P. 766 (1924).
61 Id. at 586, 224 P. at 767.
62 211 Cal. App. 2d 119, 27 Cal. Rptr. 72 (19e2).
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two inconsistent remedies, the plaintiff may thereafter seek the other
remedy if the change will not work a substantial injury to the ad-
verse party .... "3 The vendor's $5,500 expenses for improvements
did not prevent the vendee from bringing an action for specific
performance, since the vendor retained all income from the property
in the intervening 4 years. This court, like the De Laval court,
refused to resort to election of remedies as a mechanical test. The
facts of neither case could support an estoppel.
Since the detrimental reliance requirement of equitable estoppel
must be shown in election of remedies cases, it is logical that the pro-
cedural requirements also should be present. Equitable estoppel
is an affirmative defense which a defendant must raise for the first
time in the trial court.64 If estoppel is not so raised, the defense is
waived and cannot be urged for the first time on appeal. Two Cal-
ifornia courts of appeal differ as to whether the defendant needs to
comply with these procedural requirements when he seeks to use es-
toppel as the basis of election of remedies. A 1954 case from the first
district, Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein,65 did not require the defendant
to raise estoppel as a defense in the trial court. The court began
with the general conclusion that election of remedies is based on
estoppel. Instead of discussing the consequences of that statement
(namely, that equitable estoppel cannot be first raised on appeal), it
cited a 1930 case which had allowed the defendant to assert election
of remedies on appeal. 6 The confusing interrelation of estoppel
and election of remedies in this case leaves a plaintiff in mystery as
to what rules will be applied to his action. A more recent decision
from the third district, Modoc Mineral and Oil Co. v. Cal-Vada Drilling
& Exploration Co.,67 refused to permit an estoppel defense urged for
the first time on appeal. Since election is based on estoppel princi-
ples, that court concluded that the defense cannot be "dilatorily
raised."68
The attachment cases, 69 the De Laval case, and Ferguson v. Fa-
jardo present examples of strict compliance with the substantive re-
quirements of equitable estoppel in election of remedies. These
courts carefully considered whether sufficient detrimental reliance
existed before the defendant could invoke election of remedies as a
defense. Modoc Mineral and Oil Co. v. Cal-Vada Drilling Co. con-
cluded that the defendant must also comply with procedural require-
ments of estoppel so it refused to permit the defense to be first
raised in the appellate court.70 Such cases illustrate that the exist-
ence of election of remedies as a doctrine separate from estoppel is
63 1 B. WinaN, CALromRNA PuocuRnEs Actions § 51, at 548 (1954), quoted
in Ferguson v. Fajardo, 211 Cal. App. 2d 119, 121, 27 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74 (1962).
64 Modoc Mineral & Oil Co. v. Cal-Vada Drilling & Exploration Co., 236
Cal. App. 2d 868, 875, 46 Cal. Rptr. 508, 512 (1965).
65 125 Cal. App. 2d 175, 270 P.2d 505.
66 Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co., 107 Cal. App. 97, 105, 290 P. 127, 130,
cited in Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, 125 Cal. App. 2d 175, 178, 270 P.2d 505,
506 (1954).
67 236 Cal. App. 2d 868, 46 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1965).
68 Id. at 875, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
69 Cases cited note 50 supra.
70 236 CaL App. 2d 868, 46 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1965).
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questionable. As election of remedies becomes more closely linked to
estoppel, it ceases to be an independently viable doctrine.
Is Esioppel Always Applicable? Oiher Aliernaives
If a plaintiff's first action has been dismissed or nonsuited, much
California authority states that the defendant cannot use that prior
suit to support a claim of equitable estoppel.7 1 Since the defendant
can show no detrimental reliance by the first suit dismissed or non-
suited, the plaintiff's second action is thus allowed. The distinction of
nonsuit from dismissal is subtle. It has been stated that nonsuit is a
form of involuntary dismissal.72  A nonsuit is generally granted for
insufficient evidence, whereas a lack of prosecution (unreasonable
delay in prosecution of litigation) is the basis for most dismissals.
73
Due to their similarity,74 it is reasonable that courts treat them alike
in election of remedies problems.
Dismissal Cases
In Campanella v. Campanela,5 the plaintiff's first action based
on rescission was dismissed before reaching trial on the merits. The
court concluded that the plaintiff could bring a subsequent action
based on breach of contract.
Under well-settled principles of the doctrine of estoppel, the disad-
vantage caused the other party ... must be a real injury, such as
would, in the contemplation of the law, amount to an estoppel, and
when it is of this character the doctrine of election of remedies will
be applied by the courts.
7 6
Subsequent cases have followed this court and have applied equitable
estoppel principles allowing a second action when the first action is
dismissed.77  In Warfield v. Richey,78 for example, the lessee com-
menced an action based on fraud and sought damages for breach of
contract. That action was dismissed due to inadequate pleadings
7 1
The plaintiff filed a second action a few days later. In allowing this
second action, a suit for rescission, the court concluded in language
similar to the equitable estoppel discussion in Campanella: "There
was thus no decision on the merits, and we are unable to discern that
defendant was in any way prejudiced or harmed thereby. . . 30
71 E.g., Campanella v. Campanella, 204 Cal. 515, 269 P. 433 (1928); Her-
dan v. Hanson, 182 Cal. 538, 189 P. 440 (1920).
72 2 B. Wrrm, CALIFOmRA PROcEDUPE Trial § 123, at 1856 (1954).
78 Id. See 2 B. WIT=in, CALiFORNiA Pocauna Proceedings Without Trial
§ 27 at 1665 (1954).
74 Id.
75 204 Cal. 515, 269 P. 433 (1928).
76 Id. at 521, 269 P. at 435. The phrase "real injury" was first used in
Herdan v. Hanson, 182 Cal. 538, 189 P. 440 (1920).
77 Warfield v. Richey, 167 Cal. App. 2d 93, 99, 334 P.2d 101, 104 (1959);
Papenfus v. Webb Prods. Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 631, 633, 120 P.2d 60, 61 (1942);
Prussing v. Prussing, 46 Cal. App. 2d 347, 353, 115 P.2d 854, 857 (1941); Waters
v. Woods, 5 Cal. App. 2d 483, 490, 42 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1935).
78 167 Cal. App. 2d 93, 334 P.2d 101 (1959).
79 Id. at 96, 334 P.2d at 102.
80 Id. at 99, 334 P.2d at 104.
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Equitable estoppel as a basis for election of remedies is not the
only applicable theory when the prior action has been dismissed.
Campanella v. Campanella did not rely solely on equitable estoppel.
The court stated: "It is clear that the judgment is not res adjudicata
and therefore not a bar to the present action nor an estoppel upon
any issue therein ..... I" Reference there was to direct estoppel,
a subclass of the more general term "res judicata" which also in-
cludes merger, bar, and collateral estoppel.
8 2
A substantial number of California cases have discussed res
judicata, in lieu of equitable estoppel.13 Kramer v. Associated Al-
mond Growers8 4 involved a contract to sell land in which the yen-
dee's first action for rescission had been dismissed. In a subsequent
action for breach of contract, the court approved of the Campanella
holding that the defendant could show no "real injury" by dismissal
sufficient to amount to equitable estoppel.8 5 Yet, in its holding for
the plaintiff, the court rested its decision on the theory that "the
judgment of dismissal could not operate as res judicata.' '8 6 Other
cases have concluded that if the first case involved a dismissal on the
merits87 or a determination of the issues,88 the defendant can success-
fully interpose res judicata to prevent the plaintiff's second action.
As an example, in Morrison v. Willhoit 9 the first action was brought
to cancel two promissory notes due to fraud. The court sustained a
demurrer to this action because the plaintiff had alleged insufficient
facts to state a cause of action.90 In denying the plaintiff's second
action, the court concluded that sustaining a demurrer when a de-
fendant presents an absolute defense is a judgment on the merits.91
This defense was res judicata against any subsequent action. In
reaching this conclusion the court cited the res judicata discussion
in Campanella.9 2 In another example, Olwell v. Hopkins,93 the court
dismissed the first action because the defendant was not qualified to
do business in California, making the contract void.9 4 The plaintiff
initiated a second action based on the contract with the defendant.
The court held that the prior action barred the later one because the
previous court had already determined that the contract was void.9 5
"Their [plaintiffs'] contention that the doctrine of election of remedies
81 204 Cal. at 520, 269 P. at 435.
82 REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS at 160 (1942).
83 0lwell v. Hopkins, 28 Cal. 2d 147, 168 P.2d 972 (1946); Morrison v.
Willhoit, 62 Cal. App. 2d 830, 145 P.2d 707 (1944); Johnson v. Ota, 43 Cal.
App. 2d 94, 110 P.2d 507 (1941); Kramer v. Associated Almond Growers, 111
Cal. App. 595, 295 P. 873 (1931).
84 111 Cal. App. 595, 295 P. 873 (1931).
85 Id. at 601, 295 P. at 875.
86 Id.
87 E.g., Olwell v. Hopkins, 28 Cal. 2d 147, 168 P.2d 972 (1946).
88 E.g., Warfield v. Richey, 167 Cal. App. 2d 93, 99, 334 P.2d 101, 104
(1959).
89 62 Cal. App. 2d 830, 145 P.2d 707 (1944).
90 Id. at 835, 145 P.2d at 709.
91 Id. at 838-39, 145 P.2d at 711.
92 Id.
93 28 Cal. 2d 147, 168 P.2d 972 (1946).
94 Id. at 151, 168 P.2d at 975.
95 Id. at 149, 168 P.2d at 974.
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would not prevent them from recovering in the present action is




A second action has consistently been allowed when the first
action has been nonsuited. California case authority to that effect"
preceded Justice Cardozo's famous statement in Schenck v. State Line
Telephone Co.98 that: "fruitless recourse to a remedy withheld does
not bar recourse thereafter to the remedy allowed."99  Four years
before the Schenck case, Herdan v. Hanson'00 allowed a plaintiff to
maintain a second suit for damages where the first action for rescis-
sion had been nonsuited due to the plaintiff's failure to tender back
the deed. Herdan v. Hanson concluded: "the effect of the judgment
of nonsuit in the prior action was merely to leave the plaintiff and
defendant in the same relative position as before the action com-
menced"'u 0 so the plaintiff "is not estopped by his abortive elec-
tion from subsequently resorting to and pursuing a remedy to which
he was really entitled.'10 2 This language provides authority for
discussing equitable estoppel as the basis of election of remedies in
nonsuits.
If a prior action has been nonsuited, some later courts prefer to
discuss res judicata.10 3 In Steiner v. Thomas0 4 the first action for
rescission of a contract to convey property had been nonsuited on the
merits. The court refused to hear the plaintiff's second action for
breach of an agreement to devise property. The court discussed in-
consistency and equitable estoppel as a basis of election of remedies,
but concluded that the plaintiff was prevented from bringing the
subsequent suit by res judicata10 5 Since nonsuit was granted after
trial on the merits, the plaintiff could have asserted all the facts in
the first action.
Both nonsuits and dismissals follow similar patterns. If a non-
suit or dismissal is granted without trial on the merits, courts con-
sistently allow the plaintiff to bring another action. Courts sometimes
state that no election of remedies has occurred. 06 Campanella v.
Campanella reached that conclusion because the defendant suffered
no "real injury."'1 7 Herdan v. Hanson found that the parties re-
mained "in the same relative position as before the action com-
menced."'10 8 Other cases conclude that the defendant can show no
96 Id. at 152, 168 P.2d at 975.
97 Herdan v. Hanson, 182 Cal. 538, 189 P. 440 (1920).
98 238 N.Y. 308, 144 N.E. 592 (1924).
99 Id. at 311, 144 N.E. at 593.
100 182 Cal. 538, 189 P. 440 (1920).
101 Id. at 542, 189 P. at 442.
102 Id.
103 E.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. 2d 891, 151 P.2d 846 (1944); Steiner v.
Thomas, 94 Cal. App. 2d 655, 211 P.2d 321 (1949).
104 94 Cal. App. 2d 655, 211 P.2d 321 (1949).
105 Id. at 659-60, 211 P.2d at 324.
106 Cases cited note 77 supra.
107 204 Cal. at 521, 269 P. at 435.
108 182 Cal. at 542, 189 P. at 442.
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res judicata. 0 9 Res judicata so applied usually means direct estoppel
which precludes later litigation of matters previously determined be-
tween the parties on the same cause of action.110 Equitable es-
toppel should not be extended to include nonsuits and dismissals, since
res judicata principles adequately cover the problems. This sugges-
tion accords with section 53 of the Restatement of Judgments: "Where
the plaintiff voluntarily submits to a nonsuit, or the court directs that
he be nonsuited, or the action is dismissed without prejudice, the
plaintiff is not barred from maintaining an action on the original
cause of action."
Waiver as a Basis of Election of Remedies
Some case authority considers waiver as the basis of election of
remedies."' Waiver has been defined as "the intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right." 1 2  Election of remedies can scarcely be
called a voluntary act of the plaintiff, 31 so case law applying waiver
in election of remedies in effect disregards the definition of express
waiver. If waiver is applicable in election of remedies situations,
the act of the plaintiff, not any act or conduct affecting the defendant,
is alone sufficient to apply election.114 For example, the California
District Court of Appeal in Martin Music Co. v. Robb stated: "A
waiver can be inferred whenever the conduct of the seller [plaintiff]
is inconsistent with the idea that he still intends to enforce return of
the goods . ."-115 This is perhaps the clearest case applying waiver
as a basis of election of remedies. The defendant-buyer had breached
a conditional sales contract. The court concluded that commence-
ment of a proceeding to enforce the contract amounted to waiver. 11"6
"Any act on the part of the seller clearly manifesting an intention to
treat and rely upon the unpaid purchase price as an absolute debt
from the purchaser will be deemed an election to waive the condi-
tions of the sale, resulting in title passing to the purchaser, and pre-
cluding the seller from thereafter retaking the property."117  This
case illustrates that an election based on waiver looks to acts of the
plaintiff without considering the effect of those acts on the defendant.
Whenever waiver is mentioned as a possible basis of the election
doctrine, other theories are also often mentioned. In concluding
that the basis for the election doctrine is unclear, one case stated that
the doctrine may be based on estoppel, waiver, or inconsistency.118
109 Cases cited note 83 supra.
110 RESTATEMNT OF JUDGPEANTS at 160 (1942).
Il Martin Music Co. v. Robb, 115 Cal. App. 414, 419, 1 P.2d 1000, 1002
(1931); Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co., 107 Cal. App. 97, 103-04, 290 P. 127,
129-30 (1930). See generally Ravizza v. Budd & Quinn, Inc., 19 Cal. 2d 289,
293, 120 P.2d 865, 867 (1942).
112 4 B. WIT=I, SUmmvAvy OF CA~irFoRA LAw Equity § 93, at 2869 (1954).
113 Deinard & Deinard, Election of Remedies (pt. 2), 6 MINN. L. REV. 480,
501 (1922).
114 4 B. Wrr=, SUMiMARY OF CALiFOmRNA LAW Equity § 93, at 2869 (1954).
115 115 Cal. App. 414, 1 P.2d 1000 (1931).
116 Id. at 419, 1 P.2d at 1002.
117 Id.
118 Ravizza v. Budd & Quinn Inc., 19 Cal. 2d 289, 293, 120 P.2d 865, 867
(1942).
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Waiver, like estoppel, must be raised in the trial court.119 Unlike
estoppel, waiver is a unilateral act which operates without detriment
being shown. This was shown in Martin Music Co. v. Robb.120  If
applied as the basis of election of remedies, it could thus operate more
often than estoppel. Since election of remedies has already been
criticized as too broadly applied,'12 1 inclusion of waiver as the basis
of the doctrine would hardly seem desirable.
Conclusion
Definitional requirements of the election doctrine are rarely dis-
cussed in modern law. However, the inconsistency requirement is
still applied in cases where a plaintiff has brought an original action
for damages followed by a subsequent action for rescission. 2 2 The
order of these actions is deemed inconsistent. Since California clearly
follows the Pomeroy definition of a single cause of action,'23 that
requirement of election of remedies has merited even less discussion
than the inconsistency requirement.
Satisfaction as a basis for election of remedies, in lieu of the defi-
nitional requirements, can be unfair if courts fail to consider the
exact amount of recovery that the plaintiff gained in the first action.2
4
There has been some confusion on this point in California.125 For
that reason it may be wise to avoid satisfaction as a basis for election
of remedies. Waiver as a basis has little value, since it looks only to
the plaintiff's acts, thereby disregarding the consequences of such
acts upon the defendant.
Equitable estoppel is left as the most frequently stated basis for
the election doctrine. It does not prejudice the plaintiff's rights, if
the courts insist that the defendant show detrimental reliance. Re-
cent cases emphasize that detrimental reliance must be shown.126
If the plaintiff's first action has been dismissed or nonsuited, some
courts conclude that the defendant can show no change in posi-
tion.12 7 Equitable estoppel thus does not prevent the second action.
In similar nonsuit and dismissal cases, there is authority that res
judicata applies instead of equitable estoppel,'1 28 and it has been sug-
gested in this note that res judicata is in fact more applicable to
these procedural problems.
It is submitted that election of remedies has no independent
viability.129 Estoppel and res judicata can be employed without re-
119 See Williams v. Marshall, 37 Cal. 2d 445, 456, 235 P.2d 372, 379 (1951).
120 115 Cal. App. at 419, 1 P.2d at 1002.
121 Note 30 supra.
122 E.g., Karapetian v. Carolan, 83 Cal. App. 2d 344, 352, 188 P.2d 809,
814 (1948).
123 Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 134 P.2d 242
(1943).
124 See discussion in text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
125 Id.
126 E.g., Ferguson v. Fajardo, 211 Cal. App. 2d 119, 27 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1962).
127 Cases cited note 75 supra.
128 Cases cited notes 81 and 101 supra.
129 Deinard & Deinard, Election of Remedies, 6 Mhw. L. R-v. 480, 501
(1923): "It [election of remedies] is often mistaken for a special application
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sort to the election doctrine. These theories, in lieu of election of
remedies, enable a plaintiff to predict the consequences of his actions
and prevent the defendant from raising this technical and often non-
meritorious defense.
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